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1 Introduction
At the beginning of the research on public-key encryp-
tion, many researchers studied fast encryption procedure,
since the encryption procedure costs $O(n^{3})$ steps in the RSA
and the ElGamal cryptosystems, where $n$ is the security pa-
rameter.
In 1996, Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman proposed a
fast ring-based encryption scheme, NTRU [8]. The ring is
mainly $Z_{q}[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ , denoted by $\mathcal{R}_{X^{n}-1,q}$ . The public key
in NTRU is $h\in \mathcal{R}_{\Psi-1,q}$ . For a plaintext $m\in \mathcal{L}(d)$ and a
randomness $r\in l(d)$ , the ciphertext is obtained by
$c=h\otimes r+m$,
where $\mathcal{L}(d)$ denotes the set of $\{0,1\}$-coefficient polynomials
of degree at most $n-1$ with exactly $d$ coefficients set to 1
and $\otimes$ denotes the multiplicative operation in $\mathcal{R}_{\lambda^{\eta}-1.q}$ . The
main feature of NTRU is faster encryption and decryption
than that of the RSA and the ElGamal cryptosystems. In
precise, time complexity of each algorithm for encryption
and decryption is $O(n^{2}\log^{2}q)$ in NTRU.
On real implementations, Bailey, Coffin, Elbirt, Silver-
man, and Woodbury implemented NTRU in constrained
devices with encryption taking $O(n^{2}\log q)$ costs. Lee,
Kim, Song, and Park [12], and Buchmann, D\"oring, and
Lindner [2] reported efficient software implementations for
NTRU, whose encryption cost is $O(dn\log q)$ in the worst
case.
There were attempts for faster encryption for NTRU by
modifying the parameters. In [17], Silverman observed
that setting $n=2^{k}$ allows us to use FFT and the encryp-
tion cost is reduced to $\delta$($n$ log2 $q$). Gentry observed that
$X^{2^{k}}-1=(X^{2^{k- 1}}-1)(X^{2^{k- 1}}+1)$ over $Z$ and this induces a
ring homomorphism. By this observation, he succeeded an
attack for NTRU with $n=256$ in [6] and recommended that
$n$ should be a prime.
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There were also attempts for NTRU by modifying a
ring. In [5], Gaborit, Ohler, and Sol\’e proposed a variant
of NTRU, named CTRU and claimed that this variant al-
lows setting $n=2^{k}$ , where a ring is $(F_{2}[T])[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ .
After one month $hom$ this proposal, Amault cryptanalysed
CTRU [1]. Independently, Kouzmenko gave the analysis of
CTRU in his master thesis [11], which was based on sim-
ple linear algebra. In 2008, Vats also cryptanalysed CTRU
in 2008 [18]: he gave the same algebraic attack as Kouz-
menko’s one, and extended the results by giving a faster
attack.
Coglianese and Goi [3] gave another variant of
NTRU which is defined over a $kxk$ maoeix ring over
$Z_{q}[X]/\langle X^{n’}-1)$ , MaTRU, where $n=n’k^{2}$ . The com-
plexity for encryption of MaTRU is $O(n^{\prime 2}k^{3}\log^{2}q)$ $=$
$O(n^{2}\log^{2}q/k)$ .
Our work: We attempt to set $n=2^{k}$ , which enables us
to use FFT in encryption. Differently Rom Silverman’s at-
tempt, we use a ring $Z_{q}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ . This change ofa base
of a ring prevents Gentry’s attack, since a polynomial $X^{n}+$ ]
is irreducible over $\mathbb{Z}$ if $n=2^{k}$ .
Organlzatlon: In Section 2, we define the basic notions
and notations. We briefly review NTRU in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 gives the definition of lattices and NTRU lattices.
Section 5 reviews Gentry’s folding attack. In Section 6, we
recall the properties of the polynomial $X^{n}+1$ . We propose
our new variant ofNTRU in Section 7.
2 PrelimInaries
We say a $mnCtio\mathfrak{n}\epsilon(n)$ is negligible in $n$ if $\epsilon(n)=$
$2^{-4\log n)}$ . We denote by $v_{1}\circ v_{2}$ the concatenation of two
vectors $v_{1}$ and $v_{2}$ . Let $\langle a_{1},$ $\ldots,a_{l}\rangle$ denote an ideal generated
by $a_{1},$ $\ldots,a_{l}$ .
Let $b(X)\in Z[X]$ denote a monic polynomial of degree
$n$ . $\mathcal{R}_{b}$ denotes $Z[X]/\langle b\rangle$ . For a positive integer $n$ , NTRU is
defined on a quotient ring $\mathcal{R}_{P-1}=Z[X]/(X^{n}-1\rangle$ . For a
monic polynomial $b(X)$ of degree $n$ , we identify $\mathcal{R}_{t}$ with $Z^{n}$
by identifying $f= \sum_{l=0}^{n-1}f_{i}X^{l}\in \mathcal{R}_{b}$ with $f={}^{t}(f_{0},$ $\ldots,f_{n-1})\in$
$Z^{n}$ .
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$\overline{\frac{NameRingnqandpRef}{NTRUZ[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle Primesq,p\in Z[8]}}$
NTRU-Composite $Z[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ $2^{k}$ $q,p\in Z$ [17]
CTRU $(F_{2}[T][X])/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ Any $q,p\in F_{2}[T]$ [5]
MaTRU $M_{k,k}(Z[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle)$ Any $q,p\in Z$ [3]
NFALSE (Ours) $Z[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ $2^{k}$ $q,p\in Z$
Table 1: Vatiants ofNTRU.
Let $B$ denote $\{0,1\}$“, and $B(d)$ the set of all polynomials
of degree at most $n-1$ with exactly $d$ coefficients set to
1 and all the other coefficients set to $0$ . We define $\mathcal{T}$ as
$\{-1,0,$ $+1|^{n}$ . $\mathcal{T}(d_{1},d_{2})$ denotes the subset of $\mathcal{T}$ such that
each polynomial in $\mathcal{T}(d_{1},d_{2})$ has exactly $d_{1}$ coefficients set
to 1 and $d_{2}$ coefficients set to-l. We define $X(d_{F})$ as $\{f_{1}\otimes$
$f_{2}+f_{3}$ : $f_{i}\in B(d_{F})$ for all $i|$ . For an integer $a$ and a subset
$S\subseteq \mathcal{R}_{q}$ , we define $aS$ as $\{af : f\in S\}$ . For a subset $S\subseteq \mathcal{R}_{q}$ ,
$S$ denotes the set of the polynomials in $S$ which have the
inverses in $R_{q}$ , i.e., $S=\{f\in S$ : $\Gamma^{1}\in \mathcal{R}_{q}$ I.
3 Brief Sketch of NTRU
In this section, we briefly review NTRU. For details, see
the original paper [8] and proposals of the parameters [9,
10, 7, 19].
Let $b(X)=X^{n}-1$ . The subsets of $\mathcal{R}_{b,q},$ $\mathcal{L}_{f},$ $4,$ $\mathcal{L}_{m},$ $L$ ,
and $\mathcal{L}_{F}$ are defined later. They are used for key generation
and encryption. The parameter $p$ may be a polynomial $2+a$
rather than small prime such as 2 or 3.
Key Generatlon:
1. Choose $f\in \mathcal{L}_{f}$ and $g\in \mathcal{L}_{g}$ uniformly at ran-
dom. $f$ must be inveitible in $\mathcal{R}_{b.q}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{b.p}$ .
2. Set $F_{q}=\Gamma^{1}$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b.q}$ .
3. Compute $h=p\otimes g\otimes F_{q}$ .
4. The public key is $h$ and the secret key is $f$.
Encryptlon: A plaintext is $m\in \mathcal{L}_{m}$ .
1. Select $r\in L$ uniformly at random.
2. Compute $c=h\otimes r+m$.
3. The ciphertext is $c$ .
Decryption: A ciphertext is $c\in \mathcal{R}_{b.q}$ .
1. Compute $a’=f\otimes c$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b.q}$ .
2. Compute $a=p\otimes g\otimes r+f\otimes m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b}$ ffom $a’$
by using a centering algorithm.
3. Compute $F_{p}=f^{1}$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b.p}$ .
4. Compute $m’=F_{p}\otimes a$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b.p}$ .
5. The obtained plaintext is $m’$ .
Remark 3.1. We first confirm the following equation:
$a’=f\otimes(h\otimes r+m)=p\Phi g\Phi r+f\otimes m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b,q}$ .
The centering algorithm sets the coefficients of $a$ into $[A-$
$q/2,A+q/2)$ for some $A$ . Using the centering algorithm, we
have, with high probability,
$a=p\otimes g\otimes r+f\otimes m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b}$ .
Thus, we obtain
$m’=F_{p}\otimes a=F_{p}\otimes(\Phi fflr+f\otimes m)=F_{p}\otimes f\otimes m=m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{b.p}$ .
In order for the decryption process to work correctly, it is
necessary that $|a|_{\infty}<q/2$ , where, for any $x\in \mathcal{R}_{b},$ $|x|_{\infty}$ is
defined as $\max_{l}\{x_{l}\}-\min_{j}\{X;$ I and called width. The subsets
$\mathcal{L}_{f},$ $\mathcal{L}_{9},$ $L,$ $l_{m}$ , and $\mathcal{L}_{F}$ are careffilly chosen to satisfy the
above norm bound with overwhelming probability.
There are five instantiations of NTRU, NTRU-1998 [8],
NTRU-2001 [9], NTRU-2005 [10], NTRU-2007 [7], and
NTRU-2008 [19]. Table 2 summarizes the parameter sets
of these instantiations. Table 3 reports example parameters
ofNTRU-2008.
$\overline{\frac{ParameterSetsnd_{F}\ d_{r}d_{9}ExpectedSecu\dot{n}ty}{ees449ep1449134149128- bit}}$
$ees613epl$ 613 55 204 128-bit
$ees76$ lepl 761 42253 128-bit
ees$853epl$ 853 268284 256-bit
$eesll7$ lepl 1171 106394 256-bit
eesl $499epl$ 1499 79499 256-bit
Table 3: Example of the parameter sets in NTRU-2008 [19].
4 NTRU Lattices
Lattlces: In this paper, we use the basic notions and no-
tations of lattices. A lattice is an additive discrete subgroup
of $\mathbb{R}^{m}$ . A lattice $L\subseteq R^{m}$ of rank $n$ has a basis $B\in \mathbb{R}^{mxn}$ such
that $L(B)=\{Bx:x\in Z^{n}\}$ , where the rank of $B$ is $n$ . For de-
tails on lattices and cryptography based on lattice problems,
see, e.g., the textbook by Micciancio and Goldwasser [15]
and the latest survey by Micciancio and Regev [16].
4.1 NTRU lattices
Let $p^{-1}$ be the inverse of$p$ in $h$ . An NTRU lattice [4] is
generated by a basis
$H.=\{\begin{array}{ll}Rot(1) Rot(0)Rot(p^{-1}h) Rot(q)\end{array}\}$ .
As noted by Coppersmith and Shamir [4], the lattice $L(H)$
includes a short vector $f\circ g$ containing a secret key since
$p^{-1}h\equiv\Gamma^{1}\otimes g(mod q)$ .
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Table 2: Parameter sets. In NTRU-1998, $f$ must be invertible in $\mathcal{R}_{p}$ .
5 Gentry’s Folding Attack We define an expansion factor, which is a rcstricted version
In [6], Gentiy proposed an attack against NTRU- ofthat proposed by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [13]:
Composite. Let us assume that $n$ is a composite number.
The factor of $n$ will be denoted by $d$. $EF(n=\max||gmod f|_{\infty}/geZ[x],dcg(g)\leq 2\langle\deg(g)-1)||\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}|_{\infty}$ .
For $f$ $=$ $(f_{0}, \ldots,f_{n-1})$ $\in$ $Z[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ , the d-
dimensional folded polynomial of$f$ is defined by
A simple calculation shows that $EF(x^{n}\pm 1,2)=2$ .
Since the expansion factor of $X^{n}+1$ is 2, we have that,
$\theta_{d}(/)=[\sum_{l--0mod d}^{0\preceq i<n}f_{i},\sum_{i=1mod d}^{0\leq l<n}f_{i},$ $\ldots,\sum_{i=d-1mod d}^{0\leq i<n}f_{i},)$ . $||f\otimes g||_{\infty}\leq 2||fg||_{\infty}$ .
for any two polynomials $f$ and $g$ of degree at most $n-1$ ,
6.2 Serving a FFT-llke computation
This mapping $\theta_{d}$ is a ring homomoiphism ffom
$Z[X]/\langle X^{n}-1\rangle$ to $Z[X]/\langle X^{d}-1\rangle$ (see [6, Theorem 1]). We
ca ac groun $s$ : et $qe$ a $pr$ me RecallMathematl l b k ds L be i . $R$
that for an element in $Z^{*}$ its multi limention that $\theta_{d}$ has a good property with respect to norms. l p cative order divides$q$$-1$ . Thus, there is a sub rou of order 2 $i$For the $\ell_{\infty}$ -norm, we have that $||\theta_{d}(/)||$ $<(n/d)||f|$
$q$ $s$ g p $0$ $n$ in $Z_{q}$ . Let
$-$
obviously. $w$ denote an element of multiplicative order $2n=2^{k+I}$ in
Let us set $n=2^{k}$ and $d=n/2$ . Gentry considered the fol-
$Z_{q}.$ By setting $w$ as the above, the polynomial $X^{n}+1$ has $n$
lowing folded NTRU lattices of rank $n$ instead of the NTRU
roots, $w^{1},w^{3},$ $\ldots,w^{2n-1}$ , that is, $X^{n}+1= \prod_{i_{-}^{-}1}^{n}(X-w^{2l-1})$
lattices of rank $2n$ : Since $( \int,g)$ is in the NTRU lattice
over $Z_{q}$ . By the Chinese remainder theorem, we have a ring
homomorphismspanned by $h$ and its norm is shoil so $(\theta_{d}\omega, \theta_{d}(g))$ is rel-
atively short in the folded NTRU lattice $L$ of rank $n$ . Thus, $Z[X]/\langle b’\rangle$
using the LLL algorithm, one may obtain $(\theta_{d}(/),\theta_{d}(g))$ . We
$q$
1omit the details of extracting $( \int, g)\theta om(\theta_{d}\omega,\theta_{d}(g))$ . For
$\simeq Z_{q}[X]/\langle X-w\rangle xZ_{q}[X]/\langle X-w^{3}\rangle x\cdots xZ_{q}[X]/\langle X-w^{2n-}\rangle$ .
the details, see [6]. For $a$ polynomial $f\in \mathcal{R}_{X^{n}+1,q}$ , we define
5.1 Another Foldings $f=DFT_{n,w}(/)=(r(w),f(w^{3}), \ldots,f(w^{2n-1}))$ .
As noted in [6, Section 5.1], we have another folding by
a ring homomorphism $\theta$ : $Z[X]/\langle b(X)\ranglearrow Z[X]/\langle s(X)\rangle$ Let
$\otimes$ denote a component-wise multiplication. So, DFT
for some $b(X)=s(X)\cdot t(X)$ , which is given by $\theta\omega=$ induces the above ring homomorphism ffom $(\mathcal{R}_{X^{n}+1.q},\otimes, +)$
$f(X)+\langle s(X)\rangle$ . Gentiy’s folding attack may be usehl if the to $(D,, +)$ .
following two conditions hold: (1) the degree of $s$ is rel- Computatlonal backgrounds: It is well-known that
atively high, that is, $N/c$ for some constant $c$ and (2) the DFT(7) can be computed by $o(n\log n)$ additions and mul-mapping $\theta$ preserves a good norm bound, i.e., there exists a tiplications. From the definition, it is easy to veri $\theta$ that
constance $c’$ such that for any $f\in \mathcal{R}_{b},$ $||\theta\omega||_{\infty}\leq c||f|_{\infty}$ .
6 The propertles of $X^{n}+1$
$DFT_{n.w}\omega=(\begin{array}{lllll}w^{0} w^{1} w^{2} \cdots w^{\prime\triangleright 1}w^{0} w^{3} w^{6} \cdots \theta^{(n-1)}| | | \ddots |w^{0} w^{2n-1} w^{4(n- 1)} \cdots w^{(n-1Kn-1)}\end{array}).\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{n-1}^{f_{1}}f_{0}]$.
In the hash hnction SWIFFT [14], the polynomial $X^{n}+1$
serves a fast computation and a security proof. We employ
the polynomial to use it in the encryption scheme. By reorderin, we obtain the followin$g$ , $0$ oo g equation.In this section, we review the properties of the polyno-
mial, its expansion factor and FFT-like computations.
$DFT_{n,w}\omega=(_{DFT_{n/2,w^{2}}(f_{e})-(w,w^{3},\ldots,w^{2n-1})DFT_{n}/2.\nu Cf_{0})}^{DFT_{n/2,w}z(f_{e})+(w,w^{3},\ldots,w^{2n-1})DFT_{n/2,w^{2}}(f_{0})})$ ,
6.1 Small Expansion Factor
The expansion factor of a polynomial $f$ captures the re- where
$f_{e}=(f_{0},f_{2}, \ldots,f_{n-2})$ and $\int_{0}=(f_{1},f_{3}, \ldots,\int_{n-1})$ .
Com utin recursivellation of the norms in the ring $\mathcal{R}$ and the quotient ring $\mathcal{R}_{f}$ . p g $y$, we can obtain $DFT_{n.w}(J)$ with$O(n\log n)$ additions and multiplications.
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7 Our Proposal 7.3 On Gentry’s attack
In order to use a FFT-like computation to compute mul-
tiplications, $n$ should be the power of 2, say $2^{k}$ for some $k$ .
However, since $X^{2}-1$ has a factor $X^{2^{-}}-1$ , Gentiy’s fold-
ing attack works well in practical. To prevent the attack, we
set the base polynomial $b’(X)=X^{2^{k}}+]$ which is irreducible
over Z. Additionally, the polynomial $X^{2^{k}}+1$ serves FFT-like
computations in $Z_{q}[X]/\langle X^{2^{i}}+1\rangle$ for suitable $q$ .
7.1 ProposaI
Our proposal is as follows:
Key Generatlon:
1. Choose $F\in \mathcal{L}_{F}$ and $g\in 4$ uniformly at ran-
dom. $1+3F$ must be invertible in $\mathcal{R}_{q}$ .
2. Set $F_{q}=r^{1}$ in $R_{q}$ .
3. Compute $\tilde{F}_{q}=DFT(F_{q})$ and $\tilde{g}=DFT(g)$ .
4. Compute $\tilde{h}=3(\tilde{g}\tilde{F}_{q})$ .
5. The public key is $\tilde{h}$ and the secret key is $I=$
$DFT(1+3F)$ .
Encryption: A plaintext is $m\in \mathcal{L}_{m}$ .
1. Select $r\in \mathcal{L}_{r}$ uniformly at random.
2. Compute $\tilde{r}=DFT(r)$ and rk $=DFT(m)$ .
3. Compute $f=\tilde{h}$ $”+\tilde{m}$.
4. The ciphertext is $\tilde{c}$ .
Decryptlon: A ciphertext is $\tilde{c}$ .
1. Compute $\tilde{a}’=\tilde{f}\tilde{c}$ .
2. Compute $a’=DFT^{-1}(f’)$
3. Compute $a$ by using the centering algorithm as
in NTRU.
4. Compute $m’=a$ in $\mathcal{R}_{p}$ .
5. The obtained plaintext is $m’$ .
Notes: In encryption, the ciphertext is $\tilde{c}$ rather than $c$ .
This enables us to decrease the number of DFT in decryp-
tion.
7.2 Correctness
As in NTRU, we have that
$a’=f\otimes(h\otimes r+m)=3\otimes g\otimes r+f+m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{\nu_{2}}q$ .
Ifwe have that
$a=3\theta g$ \copyright r $+$ f $\otimes$ m in $\mathcal{R},$ ,
we can obtain that
$m’=a=3\otimes g\otimes r+f\otimes m=3\Phi fflr+(1+3mm=m$ in $\mathcal{R}_{\nu.3}$ .
We note that
$||a||_{\infty}\leq 2||3\cdot g\cdot r+f\cdot M|_{\infty}$ ,
where. denote the multiplicative operation in $\mathcal{R}$ . Thus, if
$||3\cdot g\cdot r+f\cdot M|_{\infty}\leq q/4$ , we have that $a=3\otimes g\otimes r+f\otimes m$
in $\mathcal{R}_{\nu}$ . Hence, the expansion factor of the base polynomial
$b’$ plays a key role for correct decryptions. This is one of
the reason that we set $b’$ as $X^{n}+1$ .
NFALSE prevents Gentry’s folding attacks and its exten-
sions by choosing the ring $Z[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$ , since $X^{n}+$ ] is
irreducible over $Z$ if $n$ is the power of 2.
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